

# The Effectiveness of Criminal Intelligence Management: A Slovenian Case Study

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Owing to increasing crime rates and simultaneous cuts in police funding, traditional policing no longer ensures that the implementation of police functions is carried out efficiently. Therefore, new policing strategies have begun to emerge, the majority of which are based on a growing awareness of the applicability of information as a form of support in the decision-making process. One such strategy is intelligence-led policing, which not only represents an upgrade to criminal intelligence but is also an important movement in 21<sup>st</sup> century policing. As an EU member state and therefore a European Criminal Intelligence Model subsystem, Slovenia decided to establish a national criminal intelligence model based on intelligence-led policing. On the basis of a qualitative research study on criminal intelligence in the Slovenian police, we have proposed measures which are aimed at increasing the efficiency of the implementation of an optimal national criminal intelligence model therein.

**Keywords:** criminal intelligence, intelligence-led policing, criminal analysis, intelligence products, national criminal intelligence model, European Criminal Intelligence Model

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## 1 Introduction

Owing to increasing crime rates, a growing fear of victimisation, and simultaneous cuts in police funding, traditional policing no longer ensures that police functions are implemented efficiently. Therefore, new policing strategies have begun to emerge, the majority of which are based on a growing awareness of the applicability of information as a form of support in the decision-making process. One such strategy is intelligence-led policing, which represents a central theme in modern-day policing and can be reasonably considered to have become an important movement in 21<sup>st</sup> century policing (Potparič & Dvoršek, 2010; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008).

The development of intelligence-led policing stems from the realisation that quality criminal intelligence represents the lifeblood of any modern law enforcement organisation, making it possible to clearly understand criminal offences and crime, identify perpetrators of criminal offences, establish interconnected criminal offences, and predict problems (Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, 1997). According to Flood (2004), an important factor contributing to the development of intelligence-led policing was the recognition that, due to the increasing gap between the number of staff and

the funds available on the one hand, and crime rates on the other, it became necessary to make it a priority to improve the information handling system and, in particular, to achieve a systematic collection and analysis of information and to create quality criminal intelligence.

Recognising the importance of establishing proactive policing methods that were based on the principles of intelligence-led policing, the EU introduced a new method of policing into the EU security architecture with the Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security, and Justice in the European Union, which was adopted by the European Council in 2004. Furthermore, at the 2005 meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, a decision to establish a European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM) was adopted, and for the principles of intelligence-led policing to be implemented both by EU agencies and EU member states (Council of the European Union, 2005).

In 2006, Slovenia was assessed by EU experts to have not yet established a criminal intelligence-based policing strategy that would facilitate a proactive approach to reducing crime. As a result of these findings, the Resolution on the National Programme of Prevention and Suppression of Crime for the period 2007–2011 (Resolucija o nacionalnem programu preprečevanja in zatiranja kriminalitete za obdobje 2007–2011, 2007), and the Resolution on the National Programme of Prevention and Suppression of Crime for the period 2012–2016 (Resolucija o nacionalnem programu preprečevanja in

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zatriranja kriminalitete za obdobje 2012–2016, 2012), both include requirements regarding the development of criminal intelligence and the implementation of the concept of intelligence-led policing in crime prevention and reduction.

Presented below are the results of our research regarding criminal intelligence in the Slovenian police, which represent a contribution towards improving the efficiency of the implementation of this new policing method, because, according to Žurga (2004), in order to introduce changes in an organisation, a thorough understanding of the situation in the organisation is required to provide the basis for the implementation of changes.

## 2 The Concept of Criminal Intelligence and the Concept of Intelligence-Led Policing

The concept of criminal intelligence constitutes a relatively new approach to criminal investigation and was developed in English-speaking countries as a response to the inefficiency of the existing concepts. The development of criminal intelligence by the police drew significantly from the knowledge and experience of military intelligence and intelligence carried out for the requirements of national security.

Criminal intelligence is a policing (investigative) activity and philosophy, the basic elements of which include the organised capture, evaluation and analysis of information with a view of supporting efficient crime reduction efforts at all levels. The final product of this process is criminal intelligence, which, according to Europol's definition (Brown, 2007), is based on raw information about crimes, events, perpetrators, suspects, and so on. Criminal intelligence is the enhancement of this basic information, providing additional knowledge about criminal activity. Criminal intelligence provides information that is normally unknown to the police and is intended for use to enhance the efforts made by investigators; it is often referred to as "information designed for action".

*The International Association of Chiefs of Police defines criminal intelligence as police activity which is aimed at the lawful collection of information from every available source and its analysis in order to provide tactical and strategic criminal intelligence on the existence and identity of persons and groups suspected of criminal offences and on their available resources. The aim of such efforts is to improve crime prevention and reduction, and to facilitate attaining the goals and priorities of the police organisation. The final product of this process is criminal intelligence, which is made up of combined and analysed information to be communicated to the final user in order to predict, prevent or control criminal activity (Peterson, 2005).*

The term "Intelligence-Led Policing" emerged in the United Kingdom in around 1990, when the Kent Police sought to develop a new method for dealing with increased property crime against a backdrop of cuts to the police budget. Police chiefs were convinced that the higher percentage of crimes committed in their area was the result of criminal activity carried out by a small number of perpetrators. The concept involved the idea that the police would only respond to emergency calls made by citizens, redirecting all other calls to services outside the police organization. In this way, the police were able to steer their newly available resources towards acquiring information and creating criminal intelligence on the criminal groups and individuals that were responsible for the majority of property crimes (Mallory, 2007; Peterson, 2005).

Intelligence-led policing, which represents an upgrade to the criminal intelligence concept, brought greater emphasis to proactive policing, as opposed to the traditional understanding of policing which is predominantly reactive by nature and based on a system of regular patrolling, rapid response to calls made by citizens, the use of police officers for criminal investigations and reliance on the police and the legal system. Intelligence-led policing therefore rests on the idea that the primary police function is to prevent and detect crime and not to respond to and deal with crimes that have already been perpetrated (Guidetti, 2006; Weisburd & Eck in Ratcliffe, 2008).

Carter (2009: 80) proposed the following definition for the intelligence-led policing strategy: "It is the collection and analysis of information related to crime and conditions that contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats."

Perhaps the easiest way of explaining intelligence-led policing is to use Ratcliffe's 3i model (interpret, influence, impact), which is a simplified description of intelligence-led policing, a process that can actually be much more complex. According to this model, a successful intelligence-led policing system is one that is able to interpret the criminal environment through information collection and analysis, convey that intelligence to decision-makers and influence their thinking so that decision-makers in turn design creative crime reduction policies that have an impact on the criminal environment (Ratcliffe, 2004).

Nevertheless, countries should be aware that there is no universally accepted definition of intelligence-led policing and no implementation manual, which means that in introducing the intelligence-led policing model, different experience and methods of implementing the concept of intelligence-led policing should be considered while the implementation should

be adapted to the characteristics of each individual organisation. The establishment of a criminal intelligence system is a precondition for its upgrade to an intelligence-led policing model (Carter, 2009).

Unfortunately, the reality in Slovenia and most EU member states is the failure to match the conclusion above concerning the intelligence-led policing concept. The fact remains that intelligence-led policing was embraced by only a few member states, and the majority did not express great enthusiasm for setting up the new concept, which also entails a cultural shift for most member states' law enforcement organisations (House of Lords, 2008). It is a question of whether the member states' senior representatives at the October JHA Council meeting in 2005, when they adopted conclusions related to setting up the intelligence-led policing concept in EU internal security architecture, even understood the meaning of the intelligence-led policing concept or realised the changes that would have to be made in law enforcement organisations for the new law enforcement activity model to replace the traditional model.

A proactive approach based on intelligence-led policing is also contained in the Stockholm Programme (Council of the European Union, 2009) as an important principle on which internal security strategies for the protection against organised crime, terrorism, and serious crime must be based. Unfortunately, the interior and justice ministers of the EU member states have missed an opportunity to specifically emphasise the need for intensified promotion of intelligence-led policing principles in setting up the genuine European law enforcement culture mentioned in the Stockholm Programme, which is definitely very important for establishing an effective ECIM. One possible reason for this is also that representatives of the member states at the strategic level are often unfamiliar with the essence of intelligence-led policing and do not understand it; therefore they cannot be expected to see that poor understanding of intelligence-led policing principles is an obstacle to building an effective system of crime reduction and prevention in the EU. This view is supported by the House of Lords report (2008), which states that officials from member states are unable to tell, some years later, whether the agreements reached in 2005 concerning the establishment of a common intelligence-led policing methodology have yielded any results or not, or to what extent the concept has been implemented, and that they do not understand at all what result should represent a final goal.

It can therefore be established that the EU member states have decided, at least at a declarative level, to make a shift towards a more proactive, intelligence-led law enforcement approach to tackling all forms of serious criminal activity, partic-

ularly organised crime groups. However, the intelligence-led policing concept is only slowly being introduced or is not used at all at the national level in the member states, with the exception of some countries such as the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden, whose presentations of the functioning of their national intelligence models and various research studies in this field have been published and made available (Association of Chief Police Officers, 2007; Den Hengst & Staffeleu, 2012; Den Hengst & Ten Mors, 2012; Edlund, 2009; The Federal Police, 2010; Maguire & John, 2004).<sup>2</sup>

However, regarding other member states, there is little or no information at all about how they implement the concept of intelligence-led policing. In this context, additional input could be provided by the EU through the creation of a special "evaluation mechanism", thus enabling a better insight into the current state of affairs regarding the use of the concept of intelligence-led policing in the member states. Recommendations based on the evaluation results could certainly contribute to a faster and more efficient establishment of a common intelligence-led policing methodology.

In our opinion, the concept of intelligence-led policing is the only concept that in fact provides an answer to contemporary challenges posed by rising levels of crime, which are becoming increasingly sophisticated and international in nature. Until now, reliance on reactive policing has led to a situation where, faced with limited resources, we cannot provide an effective response. Consequently, the member states should more actively seek to introduce and use the concept of intelligence-led policing at the national level in order to facilitate a clear understanding of criminal offences and crime, the identification of active offenders and associated criminal offences and the prediction of possible problems, resulting in an increased efficiency of crime prevention and repressions both at the national level and at the international level within the framework of ECIM.

### 3 Case Study of Criminal Intelligence in Slovenia

The main purpose of this research was to diagnose and evaluate criminal intelligence in the Slovenian police. In our

<sup>2</sup> The fact that the aforementioned countries have more experience in the concept of intelligence-led policing is also proved by the Harmony Project, which was launched by Belgium in cooperation with the Netherlands, the UK and Europol in 2010. The Harmony Project harmonised the functioning of all subsystems within the ECIM and established a real European policy cycle, representing an important contribution to a more efficient implementation of intelligence-led policing at EU level (Potparič & Dvoršek, 2011).

research, we were interested in the general understanding of criminal intelligence, the concept of intelligence-led policing and the situation with regard to the components, structures and processes necessary for criminal intelligence to function.

The research was conducted using qualitative methods, which enabled an in-depth study of the subject to be carried out and for its key characteristics to be identified (Ragin, 2007). Ratcliffe's 3i model was used as the theoretical framework to assess the situation regarding criminal intelligence in the Slovenian police.<sup>3</sup>

Within the scope of the research, 33 interviews were conducted in June 2013; 15 with criminal analysts and 18 with criminal police managers. The semi-structured interview method was used for data collection. The research was conducted on each of the eight regional police directorates in Slovenia, including the General Police Directorate at the national level.

In addition, the contents of internal documents dealing with criminal intelligence were analysed as secondary empirical material. The findings of the primary and secondary materials were combined with the author's observations derived from his service in the Slovenian criminal police.

The results of the research are presented below. The first part describes the general understanding of criminal intelligence and the concept of intelligence-led policing. The following sections present the results in terms of assessing the situation regarding criminal intelligence in the Slovenian police according to individual components of the "3i model": the interpretation of the criminal environment; the influence on decision-makers; and the impact of creative crime reduction policies on the criminal environment.

### 3.1 General Understanding of Criminal Intelligence and Intelligence-Led Policing

The purpose of the first part of the research was to gain insights into a basic understanding of both concepts, taking into account the numerous conclusions and objectives contained in various strategic documents in Slovenia regarding criminal intelligence and intelligence-led policing as its upgrade. An understanding of both concepts is particularly significant because, according to several experts, understanding and the training and raising of awareness that follow are a prerequisite for the efficient implementation of the new type of policing (Carter & Carter, 2009; Guidetti, 2006; Maguire & John, 2004; Peterson, 2005).

<sup>3</sup> This model was also used by Ratcliffe (2005) as the framework to evaluate the intelligence process in New Zealand.

According to the research, the concept of criminal intelligence is correctly understood by 61% of all respondents. The percentage of those who correctly understand this concept is slightly higher among analysts (67%), while 56% percent of managers correctly understand this concept.

Those respondents who do not understand criminal intelligence generally associate it with the acquisition of information through human sources and informants<sup>4</sup>. The majority of the respondents do not even consider analysis to be a required phase when carrying out criminal intelligence:

"Criminal Intelligence is the collection of data and information, operational data, particularly from the field; not so much known data, but mostly data we obtain in a so-called proactive way, that is to say, through human sources and informants." (manager9)

According to the replies received, the percentage of respondents who did not understand the concept of criminal intelligence was as low as 39%. Approximately one third of respondents had undergone training on criminal intelligence within the framework of the Slovenian police, which mainly comprised a presentation of the work carried out with human sources and informants. The remaining two-thirds had not been offered any training and had reached an understanding of the concept of criminal intelligence during their several years of experience in operational policing and through working with human sources and informants. The large number of respondents who, despite not having undergone any criminal intelligence training, associate this area exclusively with informant handling leads to the conclusion that the perception that criminal intelligence is equivalent to working with human sources and informants is quite wide-spread among criminal investigators in the Slovenian police.

The large number of respondents who correctly understood the concept of criminal intelligence indicate that this understanding was not the result of any training implemented within the framework of the Slovenian police, but rather stemmed from self-education combined with regular work in the unit and training implemented by foreign law enforcement authorities such as the FBI, DEA, the UK police force, UK customs and Europol.

With regard to the concept of intelligence-led policing, which represents an enhancement to criminal intelligence in

<sup>4</sup> In the Slovenian police, there is a distinction between human sources and informants. Informants represent a special category of human sources that are registered and handled in a formalised manner.

terms of a greater emphasis on a preventive and proactive approach and the planning and allocation of resources in the organisation, the replies submitted by the respondents reveal an even greater lack of understanding of this concept. As a case in point, 73% respondents had no understanding of the concept whatsoever or had not yet heard about it. Among the managers interviewed, only 22% understood the concept of intelligence-led policing, whereas this percentage was 33% among the analysts.

According to the respondents, those who had an understanding of the concept of intelligence-led policing did not reach this level of awareness by attending training sessions organised by the Slovenian police but, as is the case with the concept of criminal intelligence, this was primarily the result of self-education or participation in seminars implemented by foreign law enforcement authorities.

The research shows that the very workforce that is supposed to be the driving force behind the introduction of a new approach to policing has insufficient knowledge of the concept of criminal intelligence and intelligence-led policing.

Among the problems highlighted in their statements, the respondents drew attention to issues regarding ambiguous terminology in the field of criminal intelligence, which has resulted in an erroneous understanding of the concept of criminal intelligence and intelligence-led policing, as well as an inadequate legal definition of criminal intelligence in the Police Tasks and Powers Act.

## 3.2 Interpretation of the Criminal Environment

### 3.2.1 Structure of Criminal Intelligence Units

The research revealed differences between the structure of six regional criminal intelligence units (CIUs) and that of the national Criminal Intelligence Centre (CIC). Two regional police directorates did not even have a CIU. Each of them, however, had one analyst position defined in their job classifications; in one directorate the analyst post was occupied while in the other the position was vacant.

We found variations across regional CIUs in the number of posts classified for analysts who are the central and essential element of criminal intelligence. In addition to analysts, the vast majority of the posts in CIUs have been reserved for informant handlers. In addition to differences in the number of analysts and informant handlers employed, the research also revealed different ratios between both types of staff across the CIUs.

One of the reasons why CIUs within the Slovenian police demonstrate such structural variance is because project management principles were disregarded during the implementation of the new crime prevention and reduction approach. The research showed that no project organisation had been established to manage the process of transformation in criminal intelligence implementation and development. The absence of a project management approach coupled with a lack of understanding of criminal intelligence and the principles of intelligence-led policing has led to the slow and uncontrolled implementation of criminal intelligence in police directorates. They are left to their own devices and are obliged to rely on their own interpretations of criminal intelligence which, pursuant to the Resolution on the National Programme of Prevention and Suppression of Crime for the period 2007–2011, should have become fully operational by the end of 2011:

“My experience of launching a CIU in our force is that we were left to our own devices and had to go figure it out ourselves ...” (manager10)

“In Slovenia, it will take a great deal of work to define uniform standards for establishing and developing criminal intelligence.” (analyst9)

By positioning informant handlers within CIUs, attempts were made to improve the flow of informant-supplied information to analytical services and to ensure that all information supplied by informants and other human sources was analytically processed.

Despite the aforementioned advantages of the CIU organisational structure, respondents pointed out some specific problems. The research found that, in practice, it is often the case that informant handlers skip the analysis phase and disseminate raw information to operational units. This is counterproductive because this is the reason why analysts and informant handlers are employed by a CIU in the first place. This clearly demonstrates the informant handlers' lack of understanding of criminal intelligence:

“Currently, the system is not operational, at least not in a way that would allow analysts to access the full scope of information supplied. The informant-supplied information goes straight to operational levels.” (analyst1)

Most of the respondents drew attention to another issue related to informant handlers and their (underdeveloped) sense of responsibility in the process of gathering criminal information. Informant handlers tend to interpret their informant/human resource handling role as strictly related to this

particular source while believing that analysts should deal with other information sources and be held responsible for that.

The research confirmed, however, that some CIUs have a very clear understanding of the role of informant handlers whom they regard as conventional intelligence officers responsible for all information sources. These officers actually operate in this way. When asked to comment on the information gathering practices within CIUs, respondents stated that they primarily supported and preferred the conventional organisational structure of CIUs (Centar za demokratsku kontrolu orožanih snaga, 2012), which comprises a supervisor, administration staff, analysts and intelligence officers responsible for obtaining information from a variety of sources.

We found that none of the criminal police units within the Slovenian police met the recommended analyst/investigator per police unit ratio which is set at 1:12 (IALEIA in Baker, 2009). In order to define the ratio, the number of classified police officer/investigator posts for each unit was taken into account. When compiling the statistics for regional criminal police units, also referred to as criminal police divisions, we intentionally left out the local criminal police groups operating at police stations in order to avoid even more discouraging ratios. The best investigator/analyst ratio reported was 18:1, which was in Celje's criminal police division, whereas the worst ratio of 55:1 was identified in Kranj's criminal police division.<sup>5</sup>

### 3.2.2 Ability to Interpret the Criminal Environment

The interpretation of the criminal environment is only as efficient as the process of gathering information which is then evaluated and entered in the information system, but the system, however, must ensure the easy retrieval, re-use and sharing of information. The research showed that the existing information system for the Slovenian police is relatively good as it enables all the police officers and criminal investigators to enter and search for information. In this way, police officers and criminal investigators acquire diverse information from a variety of sources. Nevertheless, respondents reported certain difficulties with respect to direct entry and the access functions enabled by this system.

A number of the respondents felt that police officers and criminal investigators tend to enter insufficient information. Respondents said there were two main reasons for this: first,

the lack of awareness of the importance of information gathering/entry for criminal intelligence purposes; and, second, the absence of the obligation to enter information. The lack of awareness is attributable to insufficient training and the poor promotion of the new concept of policing which, unlike reactive policing, focuses primarily on the gathering, exchange and management of information for the purposes of crime prevention and reduction:

“The problem of information ownership has not been formalised. There are no clear rules as to how the information should be used and who may have access to it. The fact is the information and data are often available, but have not been recorded anywhere.” (analyst11)

Another hindrance identified by the respondents with regard to data entry/exchange was that, in order to preserve power and demonstrate their importance, some individuals refuse to convey information. This is not just an issue encountered with some people, the respondents reported, but rather a mindset very much alive within certain circles of the police organisation. The key concern is that some CIUs, which should be acting as information management role models, have not been immune to this problem:

“Individual officers claim the information for themselves. Another problem is that informant handlers also hold back information, which means they are exercising some sort of authority that they don't really have. The only authority they have is to collect, evaluate and enter the information in the system, right? Then the analysts will process it and the top levels then state how it is to be used ... These guys are acting with self-importance by blocking data provided by a network of informants, and this is counterproductive.” (manager3)

In the criminal intelligence process, the evaluation phase plays an important role. Even more so because the validity of the conclusions included in the final criminal intelligence product is dependent upon it. It is vital that police officers and criminal investigators develop full awareness of the function of the evaluation stage, which is currently not the case in the Slovenian police organisation (as reported by the respondents). Police officers and criminal investigators do evaluate information before it is entered into the system, but doubts have been raised as to whether they understand the true meaning of evaluation because of the subjective manner in which it has been implemented. The research indicated that police officers perceive the evaluation process to be a means of designating greater significance to their information and, consequently, accelerating their case and increasing their reputation in the office.

<sup>5</sup> The analyst/investigator ratios found in regional criminal investigation divisions and the Criminal Police Directorate at the national level are as follows: Ljubljana – 1:45, Koper – 1:48, Maribor 1:30, Novo mesto – 1:36, Murska Sobota – 1:41, Nova Gorica – 1:33, and the Criminal Police Directorate – 1:22.

The criminal intelligence process depends on collaboration between all the police units. Of particular importance are the flow and exchange of information and criminal intelligence across all levels of the police organisation. In order to improve the sharing of information between the regional and local levels, some police directorates have trained and appointed contact persons at the police stations. A great deal of investigative activities (collecting information, investigation, crime prevention, utilisation of criminal intelligence products) takes place at local police station levels, and for this reason the connections between the local level and a regional CIU must be good.

With regard to the facilitation of information and criminal intelligence flows and exchanges across different levels of the police organisation, respondents highlighted the operational forum as an example of best practice in terms of how staff members at various levels of the police organisation can share information and data related to crime prevention and investigation.

In order for a criminal intelligence system to operate effectively, advanced criminal analysis is a prerequisite. The respondents, in particular those in managerial positions, reported they were aware of the importance of the analysis stage. Yet, the survey also revealed that current analytical levels within the Slovenian police were underdeveloped and were therefore unable to perform their functions adequately. It should also be mentioned, however, the fact that the analysts themselves are fully aware of this drawback and the effect it has had on their ability to interpret the criminal environment.

Respondents believe that one of the reasons for underdeveloped analysis is the absence of a training programme. Most of the analytical staff are self-taught, and in order to improve their analytical skills and knowledge they have to act on their own initiative. Ultimately, poor analytical qualifications translate to products of insufficient quality. The only training they have actually received was related to presentations of new software solutions:

“There is no training or qualification system in place. This has been going on for years. New staff were either self-educated or they learned from those who have been in this branch for years and are willing to teach them some procedures and bring them up to speed. I’m sorry to say this, but the system is non-existent.” (analyst12)

The following reasons were provided by the respondents to explain the insufficient levels of analytical capabilities within the Slovenian police: a lack of analytical staff, the burden of other duties shouldered by the analysts, a lack of under-

standing of the analyst role, weak IT-support and inadequate analytical staffing practices.

Based on the respondents’ comments, a clash between two subcultures in the police profession was identified: investigators/operational staff vs. the profession of analyst, which is coming to the forefront along with the progression of the criminal intelligence branch. The research revealed that criminal intelligence policing had not yet reached a level where every member of the staff knows their area of responsibility. This has led to unprofessional and unequal relations between the staff involved in the criminal intelligence process in which, by definition, analysts end up in a subordinate position. The investigator/analyst conflict is based on the belief that real police work can only be done by investigators and that crime analysis functions only as support. This clash has affected the performance of the criminal intelligence process and criminal police efforts in general:

“In our department, this is not functioning (cooperation between operational officers and analysts). Information is covered. Even when the results are good, people will start fighting.” (manager11)

“I would like to see a partnership between operational and analytical levels. There’s constant competition between departments, or – as in the case in question – divisions. At least this is how I see it. The organised crime division will not give information to the analyst because they fear he will process the information and take all the credit. This system ... well, I think we could do better.” (manager10)

Further consideration of the responses revealed the existence of other conflicts such as those between analysts and informant handlers. Informant handlers like to consider themselves more as operational workers whose role is closer to that of investigators, which partly stems from the fact that many actually come from an investigator background. Informant handlers have developed a similar attitude towards analysts as investigators; they perceive them to be their support service. This unfavourable practice is also entrenched through the appointment of investigators as heads of CIUs, who, with a few exceptions, lack an understanding of crime analysis and especially regarding their role in the context of introducing a new approach based on intelligence-led policing.

### 3.3 Impact on Decision-Makers

The objective of criminal analysis is to analyse the information collected, interpret the criminal environment and create new information, i.e. intelligence products, which are then conveyed to decision-makers who use them for crime pre-

vention, suppression and reduction. If decisions are based on criminal intelligence products, then policing is intelligence-driven or intelligence-led. In this process, as pointed out by Ratcliffe (2008), criminal analysis plays a significant role because it has a huge impact on decision-makers. It therefore follows that criminal analysis cannot satisfy itself only with informing decision-makers; it must also influence their decisions, which are reflected in greater efficiency with regard to crime prevention and suppression efforts.

According to this research, investigators in Slovenia's police operational units are the main end users of criminal intelligence products. To a lesser extent, criminal intelligence products are also used by police officers at police stations, managerial staff and, in one region, by the prosecution and the judiciary.

The reasons why Slovenia's police leadership rarely implement criminal intelligence products in their decisions may be as follows: a lack of understanding of criminal intelligence and intelligence-led policing, a lack of experience in acting upon intelligence products, and underdeveloped criminal analysis.

What also emerged from this research is that in the context of underdeveloped operational criminal analysis, which often produces case files and conducts a very limited number of analytical formats, the most frequent being telephone analysis, one cannot expect these analytical efforts to produce a significant impact on the end users of intelligence products, the majority of whom are investigators:

"There is no such thing as standard analytical tasking. We have some information available, we create data files, case files and fill data pools. As for analysis, well, telephone call analysis is the only analytical task we do." (analyst2)

"On one occasion an analyst was truly needed, but then we got the result and I wasn't really satisfied with it, but I guess the situation is getting better. Perhaps intelligence products may help to some extent, but I can't really say they make a difference." (manager13)

The problem of the negligible impact on decision-makers also lies in the fact that analysts have fulfilled their role once they have produced an intelligence product. This clearly indicates a lack of understanding of the role of criminal analysis and criminal intelligence in general. In an environment such as this, intelligence products depend on the end user's or decision-maker's goodwill and capacity to act upon such intelligence while no feedback on product applicability travels back to analysts and they are unable to eliminate their product's deficiencies.

Although the research revealed that the Slovenian police do not have a strategic analysis in place for regional CIUs, many respondents believe that strategic analysis, with its proactive approach, could significantly improve crime prevention and reduction efforts. It is not uncommon for investigators to decide upon which cases they will work and, quite often, they are also aware of the non-priority nature of these cases. As a result, the impact on the criminal environment is minor.

Strategic analysis is only in place at the national level within the CIC. In the wake of Europol's Organised Crime Threat Assessment, the CIC in 2011 produced its first Organised Crime Threat Assessment for Slovenia in an attempt to influence decision-makers to direct policing efforts towards clearly set national priorities. Only a few of the respondents reported that they were aware of the existence of such priorities in the Slovenian criminal police.

Criminal analysis within the Slovenian police has not had considerable influence on decision-makers and their prioritisation of crime prevention and reduction efforts. Police management has a tendency to set *ad hoc* priorities in response to newly emerging problems, which is indicative of the reactive orientation of Slovenia's police force:

"Priorities are set for specific cases only. There is no general guidance or strategy, there are no clear annual or periodic plans. Priorities are set for specific cases and are often based on the seriousness of the crime." (manager10)

### 3.4 Implementing the Recommendations of Criminal Intelligence Products

In criminal intelligence systems which adhere to the principles of intelligence-led policing, decision-makers generally decide, both at the operational and strategic levels, on the basis of the criminal intelligence products provided by criminal analysis. Our research has shown that in the Slovenian police, criminal intelligence products have a very minor influence on decision-makers, whose decisions can have a considerable impact on the criminal environment. Within the Slovenian police, analytical products prevail over criminal intelligence products, which are mostly intended to support specific investigations. The implementation of criminal intelligence in this way has a limited impact on the criminal environment because it does not generate police activities that are based on a proactive, multi-disciplinary, integrated and comprehensive approach in the area of crime prevention and reduction.

It is evident from the respondents' statements that the recommendations of the few existing criminal intelligence products, for instance the Republic of Slovenia's Organised Crime



Threat Assessment, which represents one of the most important Slovenian criminal intelligence products in the area of addressing crime issues proactively, are not sufficiently taken into account in decision-making. This is also confirmed by our earlier observation that priorities in the criminal police are mostly determined *ad hoc*, without reliance on any criminal intelligence products. An important role in sustaining this situation is played by policing performance indicators, which are adapted to traditional reactive police work:

“Priorities get determined in view of the current developments and trends established by the police management. Despite SIOCTA (Republic of Slovenia’s Organised Crime Threat Assessment), which did set certain priorities, new priorities are simultaneously determined by individual areas of work, and they are not really priorities of the Slovenian police.” (analyst15)

“Personally, I see criminal intelligence as being of key importance for our work. However, when we look at the evaluation of the work of the criminal police, we see that the number of filed crime reports, arrests, prison sentences, processed cases and so on still carry the most weight.” (manager8)

#### 4 Discussion

The results of our research reveal that, within the Slovenian police, the segments necessary for effective criminal intelligence do not all function properly and certain segments are not sufficiently interconnected. This situation prevents the effective functioning of criminal intelligence and represents a poor foundation for intelligence-led policing.

On the basis of this research, we have determined that, prior to the establishment of criminal intelligence, the Slovenian police had not managed to create a suitable environment conducive to the establishment of a new policing model. In the opinion of a number of experts, one of the important elements constituting a suitable environment for setting up criminal intelligence is a thorough understanding of the new policing concept being established in the organisation and publicly expressed support by the most senior police management of the transition to the new model. Research has shown that there is insufficient understanding and knowledge of criminal intelligence and intelligence-led policing among police officers, as well as an absence of publicly expressed support among the most senior management of the Slovenian police, for the activities to be carried out in the transition to the new policing model.

It needs to be pointed out that the survey interviewed criminal analysts and managers of the criminal police, who

are expected to be the key players or at least active participants in the implementation of the new policing concept. It is therefore vital that police officers who are in any way directly involved in the process of implementation and development of the new policing concept understand it well in order to be able to impart their knowledge on the new policing model to other officers.

It has been noted that the system of training and education in the area of criminal intelligence in the Slovenian police is inadequate, and in the opinion of many experts (Carter & Carter, 2009; Guidetti, 2006; Peterson, 2005), education, training and awareness of the new policing concept are key factors for a change to any organisation. This process must commence in good time and needs to start with the training of senior managers who play a key role in the implementation of changes within the organisation. The education and training segment is one of the key factors in the implementation of the national criminal intelligence model in the Slovenian police and is also emphasised in the Resolution on the National Programme of the Prevention and Suppression of Crime for the Period 2012–2016 (Resolucija o nacionalnem programu preprečevanja in zatiranja kriminalitete za obdobje, 2012).

Another observation gleaned from the research is that Slovenian terminology in the criminal intelligence field is underdeveloped and that its inconsistent usage plays a role in a poor understanding of criminal intelligence and intelligence-led policing. Inconsistent and erroneous use of terminology in the Slovenian police, which is also reflected in Article 11 of the Police Tasks and Powers Act as well as in some other police documents, gives the internal and external publics erroneous information on criminal intelligence and creates a situation in which people do not understand each other on account of the various and erroneous terminology used.

The next important critical factor in determining the implementation of the national criminal intelligence model is adequate analytical capacities, which serve as the basis for an effective interpretation of the criminal environment. The research has shown that the Slovenian police have poorly developed criminal analysis as well as an inadequate ratio between the number of criminal analysts and the number of investigators. We found that the CIUs vary significantly with regard to the number of criminal analysts and the ratio between criminal analysts and informant handlers, which is a result of deficient guidelines and the lack of uniform standards as to the structure of these units. Regional police directorates do not have strategic criminal analysis in place, which is a prerequisite for the correct functioning of the criminal intelligence model based on the principle of intelligence-led policing, where the key emphasis is on strategic planning and

the allocation of available resources. Additionally, the new organisational structure of the Slovenian police, with its emphasis on decentralisation and the strengthening of the autonomy of regional police directorates, which has as a consequence greater responsibility of a police directorate's management for the crime situation within its geographical area of responsibility, requires adequate strategic capacities which will enable the management of a police directorate to make decisions based on knowledge. According to Flood (2004), one of the creators of the British National Intelligence Model, the term "strategic" does not exclusively relate to the national level, but is also used in connection with the planning and allocation of resources at all levels of a police organisation.

The Slovenian police should immediately set up a training system for criminal analysts, both for strategic analysis and operational analysis, in order to provide all criminal analysts with training since the research revealed that the majority of analysts have not received any analytical training whatsoever.

Criminal analysis requires appropriate technical equipment and support, particularly IT, which the respondents have described as being deficient. This needs to be taken into account in ensuring adequate analytical capacities with regard to the implementation of the Slovenian criminal intelligence model.

The research has shown that, in addition to the absence of common standards in connection with the structure of CIUs, many units also have problems related to the operation of informant handlers. These problems manifest themselves particularly in the following three segments: informant handlers understand crime analysis within their unit merely as their own support service; informant handlers circumvent criminal analysis and forward raw information straight to operational units; and informant handlers only obtain information from one source, this source being informants and human sources without the informant status. The first two problems are a consequence of not grasping the essence of criminal intelligence, which in turn is a result of inadequate training as well as a lack of standards and control in the area of criminal intelligence. The third problem refers to the wide-spread belief held by informant handlers that their job is limited to obtaining information from human sources and informants. We believe that such thinking, which is a result of the organisational structure of criminal intelligence, is not beneficial for the Slovenian police, which is plagued by personnel shortages. The research has shown that such a working method on the part of informant handlers is not very effective in the area of criminal intelligence. On the contrary, such an arrangement ignores numerous other information sources and puts an additional burden on criminal analysts with the collection and exchange of information.

From the respondents' statements, it has been established that some criminal intelligence units do function in the way that informant handlers collect information for the needs of analysis from all sources, thereby easing the burden on the analysts. This method of organisation of criminal intelligence units is supported by the majority of the respondents. We are of the opinion that informant handlers should become classic intelligence officers, responsible within criminal intelligence units for obtaining, evaluating and entering information in the system.

In order for criminal analysis to function effectively, a system must be in place that ensures the provision of quality information. As for the interpretation of the criminal environment, the research identified the following obstacles which stand in the way of effective criminal intelligence: misconception of ownership of information present within the Slovenian police; police officers holding on to information to retain power, prove one's importance or on account of not trusting the adequacy of information protection; and the subjective evaluation of information by police officers. Having analysed the respondents' statements, we have come to the conclusion that holding on to information and the subjective evaluation of information represent a significant obstacle for the effective interpretation of the criminal environment.

In our opinion, this situation could be improved with a combination of positive sanctions and relegating police officers to enter all information relevant for police work in the police information collection. At the same time, it would make sense to draw up a legal definition for the ownership of information obtained during the course of police work. All of this should be coupled with an effective education and training system, which needs to properly train and equip police officers to carry out their duties within the criminal intelligence model.

On the basis of our analysis, we identified two good practices with regard to criminal environment interpretation; i.e. the designation of contact persons at police stations responsible for communication with the CIU, and the establishment of an operational forum. The operational forum is an already established systemic measure, which enables the Slovenian police to have a more effective information exchange in place between police officers at different levels of the police organisation with a view to preventing and combating crime. As for the designation of contact persons at police stations, this is an attempt by some police directorates to improve the cooperation and information flow between police stations and the CIU in carrying out criminal intelligence.

Having analysed the experience in designating contact persons at police stations in some police directorates and on

the basis of respondents' statements, we found that every police station should have a post reserved for a police officer in charge of criminal-intelligence related tasks.

It is also essential that information hubs be formed around criminal intelligence units, where all the information will flow, which would facilitate the effective management of information from all sources. This is necessary because the research has shown that the current information management system is lacking as a great deal of the information is not entered anywhere and is eventually lost, making it impossible to analyse.

Based on the respondents' statements, we identified a conflict between investigators and analysts, which has a negative impact on the ability to interpret the criminal environment in the Slovenian police. Friction and tensions occur as a result of investigators' beliefs that the only real work is operational work in the field; i.e. work that they do themselves, while criminal analysis is seen as a support or logistic service, whose work is dictated by operational officers. On account of this way of thinking, investigators do not feel the need to pass on all their information to the criminal analysis, which leads to inferior criminal intelligence products and a less effective criminal intelligence process.

The results of our research indicate that in addition to the friction between investigators and analysts, there are also tensions between analysts and informant handlers, both of whom form part of CIUs. In this aspect our findings are quite unique as other surveys have not identified any such friction within CIUs. We believe that the Slovenian police set about establishing CIUs in an *ad hoc* manner, without prior training or a clear vision as to their operation. This is confirmed by unevenly developed practices in the operation of CIUs within the Slovenian police. The Slovenian solution of including work with informants into CIUs has – in addition to positive effects, such as a faster flow of information to analysts and more effective targeted gathering of information – also negative impacts, which may be a consequence of tensions caused by police sub-culture, which definitely requires special attention.

On the basis of the research, we conclude that criminal intelligence products do not have a significant influence on decision-making in Slovenia. One of the reasons for this is that the Slovenian police do not have a developed strategic criminal analysis that generates information intended to influence decision-making at senior management positions. Another important reason is that investigators, who according to the research are the primary end users of operational criminal intelligence products, do not get criminal intelligence products of adequate quality, which is a consequence of poorly developed criminal intelligence.

If criminal intelligence products are to have an impact on decision-making, we need fully developed criminal analysis. Only then can we expect criminal intelligence products of good quality, both strategic and operational, which contain recommendations for action. Ratcliffe (2004) particularly emphasises the importance of including recommendations for action in criminal intelligence products, which contributes to criminal analysis findings being actually taken into account in decision-making in the police. Few police leaders are qualified to interpret criminal intelligence products and their translation into effective measures to reduce and limit crime. At the same time, we need to bear in mind that only criminal analysts with in depth knowledge of police work and philosophy as well as the logic and techniques of police/investigative work, can include recommendations for action in their products.

On the basis of the research, it can be concluded that the implementation of criminal intelligence recommendations in the Slovenian police is rather infrequent and relies on the discretion and qualification of end users, the majority of whom are investigators, whose limited powers prevent any major influence on the criminal environment. Moreover, there are no decision-makers' groups established in the system, or so-called tasking and co-ordination groups, which are a permanent feature in developed intelligence-led policing systems and which make sure that all devised criminal intelligence products are taken into consideration in one way or another, or used in making decisions on the measures to prevent and fight crime. This mechanism should definitely be integrated in the Slovenian criminal intelligence model if we want it to function on the basis of the intelligence-led policing concept.

## 5 Conclusion

Developing and implementing a national criminal intelligence model are time-consuming and demanding tasks. The research into criminal intelligence in the Slovenian police has shown that some mechanisms necessary for effective functioning of the criminal intelligence model are in place; however, they are not fully operational. Nor are they sufficiently interconnected, which hampers the implementation of the national criminal intelligence model. As a consequence, such situations prevents effective performance of criminal intelligence activities and represents a poor basis for the implementation of intelligence-led policing.

On the basis of the results of our research we have noted that, compared to other countries having implemented the criminal intelligence model, the Slovenian police failed to create an environment conducive to successful implementation of the new policing method, which presupposes the pres-

ence of the following: publicly expressed support of the police management; a system of education, training and awareness-raising as regards criminal intelligence in place; improved analytical capacities; project approach in devising and implementing the new policing model.

These are four of the nine critical factors pointed out by Potparič & Dvoršek (2011) and which determine the successful implementation of the criminal intelligence model. The remaining critical factors are as follows: adapting the organisational structure; an information management plan; connecting the intelligence-led policing concept with the existing policing concept; regulation; and changing the existing organisational culture.

The findings of our research reveal that the critical factors identified were not taken into consideration to a sufficient degree, which consequently manifested itself in the poor functioning of criminal intelligence in the Slovenian police and difficulties in the development of the national criminal intelligence model.

On the basis of the weaknesses identified in the existing criminal intelligence model of the Slovenian police, we propose the following measures to optimise the implementation of the national criminal intelligence model, which will take into account the principles of an intelligence-led policing concept:

- To establish a training and education system in the area of criminal intelligence and to engage experts outside the organisation;
- To draw up a document which presents criminal intelligence and the role of CIUs in the Slovenian criminal intelligence model using the correct terminology;
- To strengthen criminal analysis both in the personnel and technical areas, and to set up a criminal analyst training system;
- To establish strategic analysis at the regional level;
- To task informant handlers with gathering information from all available sources;
- To establish a system of positive sanctions as regards information handling and the regulation of duties and responsibilities of police officers pertaining to the gathering and handling of information relevant for police work;
- To classify the police officer functions responsible for criminal intelligence at local police stations;
- To establish information hubs around the criminal intelligence units where all the information will be directed, and which will be responsible for its effective management;
- To establish special *tasking and co-ordination* groups responsible for the implementation of the findings and recommendations of strategic and operational criminal intelligence products.

Through the above measures for the implementation of an optimal national criminal intelligence model, we would like to ensure that the Slovenian police establishes an effective system of information collection from all available sources, which is subsequently correctly evaluated and entered in the information system, with all police officers participating in this process in one way or another. The information collected will then be analysed by CIUs, which will permanently produce standardised strategic and operational criminal intelligence products of high quality, and be used to have an impact on the criminal environment.

Slovenia should certainly consider foreign assistance as, according to some experts, assistance by external experts can contribute considerably to a more efficient implementation of this new type of policing (Carter, 2009; Guidetti, 2006). Judging from the available research on establishing a national criminal intelligence model, it seems that one of the countries with the most experience in this field is the United Kingdom, which actually developed the concept of intelligence-led policing. Another is the Netherlands, which in 2012 carried out a reorganisation of its police and created a national intelligence model functioning based on the intelligence-led policing concept (Den Hengst & Staffeleu, 2012; Den Hengst & Ten Mors, 2012). Unfortunately, there is a lack of documented national criminal intelligence models in other member states, making it impossible to make comparisons or draw upon useful experience in implementing the intelligence-led policing concept in Slovenia.

The implementation of the proposed measures will, in our opinion, depend on levels of support provided by the most senior police management, who will also need to ensure the provision of adequate resources for the effective implementation of the national criminal intelligence model. This approach by Slovenian police management would also be in line with the guidelines contained in the Resolution on the National Programme of the Prevention and Suppression of Crime for the Period 2012–2016 (Resolucija o nacionalnem programu preprečevanja in zatiranja kriminalitete za obdobje, 2012), which refers to the development and implementation of a criminal intelligence model based on the concept of intelligence-led policing.

Care should be taken with regard to the implementation of intelligence-led policing in order to avoid the mistake made in the implementation of the community policing concept generally, when, as noted by Jere, Sotlar, and Meško (2012), the concept of community policing was followed at the declarative level; however, owing to haste and inadequate understanding of the basic philosophy and requirements, difficulties were experienced in the implementation of the concept.

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## **Učinkovitost upravljanja kriminalističnoobveščevalne dejavnosti: študija primera Slovenije**

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Zaradi spoznanja, da izvajanje policijske dejavnosti na tradicionalen način v razmerah naraščanja števila kaznivih dejanj in ob istočasnem krčenju sredstev, namenjenih za policijo, ne omogoča več učinkovitega izvajanja policijskih funkcij, so se začele pojavljati nove strategije izvajanja policijske dejavnosti, ki večinoma temeljijo na spoznanju o uporabnosti informacij kot podpore pri sprejemanju odločitev. Ena od teh je obveščevalno vodena policijska dejavnost, ki predstavlja nadgradnjo kriminalističnoobveščevalne dejavnosti in hkrati pomembno gibanje policijske dejavnosti 21. stoletja. Slovenija se je kot članica EU in s tem podsistema ECIMA odločila za vzpostavitev nacionalnega kriminalističnoobveščevalnega modela, ki bo temeljil na konceptu obveščevalno vodene policijske dejavnosti. Na podlagi izvedene kvalitativne raziskave na področju kriminalističnoobveščevalne dejavnosti v slovenski policiji smo oblikovali predlog ukrepov, ki lahko povečajo učinkovitost implementacije optimalnega nacionalnega kriminalističnoobveščevalnega modela v slovenski policiji.

**Ključne besede:** kriminalističnoobveščevalna dejavnost, obveščevalno vodena policijska dejavnost, kriminalistična analitika, obveščevalni izdelki, nacionalni kriminalističnoobveščevalni model, Evropski kriminalističnoobveščevalni model

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